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H
˙
aji Nazar had been living in the city of Yiwu in China’s Zhejiang 
Province for about two years when we first met him in March 2016.1 
Óaji Nazar ran a trading office that arranged the procurement and shipment 
of merchandise from Yiwu’s Futian market and the factories with which 
it is linked to the port of Rotterdam in the Netherlands. Óaji Nazar is a 
Farsi-speaking Sunni Muslim originally from a rural region of northeastern 
Afghanistan, but resident for many years in the northern Afghan city of 
Kunduz. His life has been characterised by mobility. In the mid-1970s he 
left Afghanistan to study in Saudi Arabia, where he also worked for a time as 
the cashier of a restaurateur from northern Afghanistan who ran a business 
in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia’s principal port city. At the end of the decade, Óaji 
Nazar was awarded a scholarship to study in the United States, but he was 
told by officials in the Embassy of Afghanistan in Saudi Arabia that due to a 
change of regime in his country he would now have to return home to get a 
new passport to travel to the United States. Óaji Nazar returned to Kabul but 
was immediately arrested by the country’s much-feared intelligence agency 
(KhAd). Having spent some time in jail, Óaji Nazar was released and thereaf-
ter played an active role in the resistance movement fighting against the pro-
Soviet government of Afghanistan; more specifically, he became a member of 
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the Islamist Hizb-i Islami party, led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. After some 
years of fighting with Hizb-i Islami mujāhidīn, Óaji Nazar began to have 
doubts about the sincerity of the leader of the regional wing of the party (for 
whom he also deputised) having seen the commander enter into truces with 
Soviet officers. Eventually, Óaji Nazar decided to leave the resistance and 
return to Saudi Arabia, a country in which he decided he would be safer than 
if he moved to Iran or Pakistan. Óaji Nazar resettled in the city of Jeddah, 
where he looked up his prior employer, only to discover that the restaurateur 
had left the city for Istanbul having had much of his savings ‘eaten’ by his 
local sponsor (kafil). Óaji Nazar secured work elsewhere in Jeddah, only 
returning permanently to Afghanistan after the defeat of the Taliban by US 
forces in 2001, at which point he secured employment as a clerk in one of the 
many NGOs active in development work in the country. By 2014, however, 
the scope for employment in such organisations was dwindling in the wake 
of the withdrawal of foreign forces and a subsequent decline in international 
development funds being ploughed into ‘reconstructing’ the country. In the 
wake of the difficulties in securing employment and therefore also raising 
his young family, Óaji Nazar was approached by one of his relatives – based 
in the Netherlands having moved there as a refugee – to ask if he would be 
interested in running an office in China that would be responsible for arrang-
ing the export of the goods in which his wholesale business dealt in Europe: 
souvenirs such as key rings and pens, as well as hashish leaf grinders that are 
principally sold in Amsterdam to tourists.
Having experience in both travel and working for trading companies, as 
well as needing money to support his family and his children through higher 
education, Óaji Nazar agreed, and established himself in Yiwu, where we 
met him in 2016. Óaji Nazar’s gentle mannerisms and deep knowledge of 
Afghan trade and mobility ensured that we soon struck up a friendship; his 
formal education in the Islamic sciences also convinced us that he would be 
an excellent source of information on the role played by Islam in shaping the 
commercial activities of Afghan traders (tojiron) in Yiwu and China more 
generally. We thus asked him how the traders from Afghanistan managed 
to live according to sharī aʿ conventions in Yiwu, especially in such areas 
of everyday life that saw repeated interactions between Afghan men and 
Chinese women working alongside one another in trading offices. Óaji Nazar 
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politely replied that according to sharī aʿ there was an argument to be made 
for treating such interactions as permissible because traders were ‘compelled’ 
to hire Chinese women to work for them as a result of their need for staff 
with expert language skills. Yet, he went on, we might well also have noticed 
that a clear majority of the traders of Afghan background in Yiwu were not 
especially ‘bothered in issues relating to sharī aʿ’ (dār qissa-i sharīʿa nistand); 
he thought such calculations rarely formed part of their thinking.
Óaji Nazar’s mobile lifestyle distils some of the key concerns with which 
this book opened: the distinction between the deep forms of Islamic cosmo-
politanism traditionally held to be available to travellers to Islamic centres 
(in the Óaji’s case, Jeddah) with forms of travel to ‘wild spaces’ where the 
Muslim faith is deemed to be at risk from un-Islamic influences. Likewise, 
Óaji Nazar’s trajectory also brings attention to the coercive nature of the 
forms of cosmopolitan-inducing mobility in which he has been involved: 
his decision to leave Afghanistan has on each occasion arisen in a context 
of instability, international intervention and violent conflict. And yet the 
Óaji’s experiences of life in the centres and peripheries of Islamic Asia cannot 
be simply defined either in terms of discourses that would treat him either 
as an Islamist militant or a hapless refugee. There is, rather, the conscious 
display of irony in the way in which the Óaji narrates his life to us: a former 
mujahidin fighter shows his ability to practically adapt to life in China and 
also to ship containers of hashish leaf grinders to the shores of Europe. Óaji 
Nazar’s mobile life provides a glimpse into a wider world of Afghan mobility, 
circulation, adaption and exchange.
Yiwu: International Trading City in China
The ethnographic focus of this chapter is on transnational networks of Afghan 
commodity traders that criss-cross much of Asia and also the world beyond. 
An increasingly important node for these networks is the Chinese city of 
Yiwu.2 For Afghan trading networks, the city has become a ‘commercial and 
affective centre’3 that is connected to multiple nodes salient for these people’s 
trading activities elsewhere, especially Moscow and St Petersburg in Russia, 
Odessa and Kharkov in Ukraine, and London, Hamburg and Rotterdam 
in Western Europe.4 Afghan traders are also active in a plethora of settings 
across Muslim Asia, especially in Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan and Iran.5
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Located 280 km from Shanghai, Yiwu is an international hub for the 
provision of commodities for everyday use and has come to play a central 
role over the past decade in the worldwide trade in Chinese-made ‘small 
commodities’.6 The International Trade City, popularly known in Yiwu as 
Futian, attracts over 210,000 buyers every day7; in addition to the buyers in 
Yiwu’s Huangyuen Market (specialising in clothes), there are other smaller 
commercial centres dedicated to the sale of auto parts and furniture. Yiwu is 
also known for its industrial area with factories mainly producing jewellery, 
hair accessories, socks and haberdashery products. Purposely designed to be 
an inland Chinese port, 650,000 cargo containers are exported from Yiwu to 
219 different countries each year.8
With approximately 2 million inhabitants, the city is also a base for 
merchants from around the world. There are over 14,000 foreign traders who 
own and/or work in trading and cargo companies involved in purchase and 
export. In addition, every year Yiwu receives around 400,000 foreign visitors 
for trading purposes.9 Travelling to and being physically present in Yiwu is 
central to the practices of global commodity traders, who must contend with 
the risks of being sold faulty goods or seeing the arrival of these in their home 
ports delayed by the production process, customs officials and port closures.10 
Traders from all over the world, including overseas Chinese, arrive from 
Latin America, Asia, the Middle East and Africa to Yiwu in order to provision 
goods and export these to the markets in which they work.
While Yiwu does attract many business people who do not belong to 
organised trading groups or networks,11 many trading networks of world 
historic significance are present in Yiwu, including traders of Levantine back-
ground from Mexico and Brazil12; Yemeni Hadrami traders who hold Thai 
citizenship13; Armenian merchants hailing from Armenia and Iran14; Afghans 
who are citizens of the Ukraine, Russia, the United Kingdom, Holland and 
Sweden, and who ship goods to all of these countries15; and Indians who are 
active in the trade between Yiwu and many countries in Africa and Latin 
America.16 Not all, but many, of the traders who operate from Yiwu work 
within and identify with extensively scattered trading communities that bear 
comparison with trading networks,17 such as the Sindhi networks studied by 
Claude Markovits and Mark-Anthony Falzon,18 and the West African Muslim 
Murids whose activities in Africa, Europe and the United States have been 
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documented by scholars including Beth Buggenhagen and Mamadou Diouf.19 
Of all these foreign traders, those arriving from West Asia constitute the 
majority in Yiwu.20 Especially visible in the city are traders from Syria, Egypt, 
Algeria, Palestine, Iraq (both Arabs and Kurds) and Iran (Persian, Azeri and 
Kurds). Yiwu thus is an important meeting point for long-distance trading 
networks, and a city that has come to be thought of by the city’s inhabitants 
and its international visitors as especially attractive to Muslim traders.21
Islamic Cosmopolitanism: Analytical Starting Points?
It is impossible to understand the nature of the Muslim networks and con-
nected forms of cosmopolitanism described and analysed in this chapter 
without considering these in relationship to modern forms of economic 
globalisation. Anthropologists are now making considerable headway in 
 documenting and understanding such forms of global connectedness. On 
the one hand, there is a growing body of literature that analyses such forms 
of trade as being a distinctively ‘bottom-up’ form of globalisation.22 On the 
other hand, those involved in such processes are widely depicted as adapting 
to the global economy or having become traders as part of a survival strategy 
developed to deal with hard times that reflect the legacy of structural readjust-
ment and neo-liberal forms of capitalism.23 These studies have brought a great 
deal to the understanding of the types of networks and connections upon 
which the global trade in low-grade goods depends.
Scholars have also increasingly recognised that globalisation from below 
and globalisation from above are interpenetrated. For example, Keith Hart 
suggests this distinction, and that between formal and informal forms of 
economic phenomena, can lead to the assumption that ‘informal’ economic 
practices, concepts and institutions are of significance only in the world’s 
‘peripheral spaces’. In turn, this obfuscates the ways in which ‘the global 
economy’ at large has undergone ‘informalisation’ over the past two decades.24 
It is also commonly acknowledged that the success of trading cities such as 
Yiwu, and consequentially its connected outposts around the world, depends 
on the policies of nation-states and local authorities, their willingness to turn 
a blind eye to practices such as the import and export of counterfeit goods, 
and, indeed, the participation of their personnel in such processes.25
In this chapter we reflect upon a network made up predominantly, 
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though not exclusively, of people of Muslim background that has come to 
fill important niches in the forms of economic activity identified analytically 
as ‘globalisation from below’. In light of this volume’s overall concerns, we 
are interested in reflecting on the extent to which the Afghan traders who 
are the focus of the chapter are helpfully conceptualised as being ‘Muslim 
cosmopolitans’ or, indeed, the creator-participants of expansive forms of 
‘Islamic cosmopolitanism’. Before proceeding to the ethnographic sections 
of the chapter, which explore the nature of the networks formed by traders 
from Afghanistan, as well as the modes in which such traders inhabit the 
city of Yiwu, we wish to make two general points about the relevance of the 
notion of ‘Islamic cosmopolitanism’ to this case study.
First, early anthropological work on globalisation argued that a range of 
mobile actors – including preachers, working-class labour migrants and even 
‘refugees’ – were fashioning hybrid and cosmopolitan identities. By crossing 
the boundaries of nation, ethnicity, culture and religion, migrants and the 
flows of finance, technology and culture they engendered, invigorated and 
forged open-ended, or ‘cosmopolitan’, forms of self and subjectivity. More 
recently, however, scholars have tempered their emphasis on the opening if 
not liberating effects of globalisation. Mobility does not inevitably result in the 
fashioning of open-ended forms of self and society or the apparently effortless 
achievement of unqualified human openness: it often leads to the production, 
rather, of heightened forms of attachment to locality.26 ‘Mobility, flows and the 
transgression of boundaries’ according to Ulrike Freitag and Achim Oppen (p. 
4),27 are leading to the production of ideas about globality, yet people in the 
midst of experiencing such processes often attempt to ‘cope with transgression’ 
by localising ‘some kind of order’, rather than celebrating their having come 
to inhabit a ‘global space’. The term ‘global’ itself, moreover, is often deployed 
in a ‘complacent’ manner that suggests an ever-expanding scale of progressive 
possibility, connected, in recent times, to forms of humanitarianism that justify 
political intervention in ‘failed states’ on the grounds that their inhabitants 
have not lived up to the standards of ‘global civilisation’: Paul Gilroy captures 
the paradoxes implicit in a such processes by referring to the forms of humani-
tarianism practised in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past decade and more as 
reflecting an ideology of ‘armoured cosmopolitanism’, a concept that bears 
some similarity to the notion of coercive cosmopolitanism introduced by the 
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editors in the opening pages of this book.28 In the context of both these ana-
lytical debates, as well as Afghanistan’s history as a testing ground for modern 
ideologies over the past century and more,29 the notion of Islamic cosmopoli-
tanism needs to be applied to the ethnographic material on which this chapter 
is based with caution. The mobile and highly flexible actors (including Óaji 
Nazar) explored below have both witnessed the ‘armoured cosmopolitanism’ 
visited upon their home country as well as come to lead mobile lives as a result 
of the coercive policies of the foreign powers active there.
Secondly, we have come to see how important it is not to take the Islamic 
aspect of the worlds created and inhabited by Afghan traders for granted. 
Afghan traders’ self-understandings, social relationships and ties with host 
communities and state officials, as well as the tactics that such people deploy 
to cross international boundaries, reveal them as being highly flexible social 
actors. This flexibility is evident at varying intersections of everyday life. One 
of the themes that we focus on in this chapter, for example, is the traders’ 
understandings of what being Muslim and ‘Afghan’ means and how this 
affects their modes of forging relations with one another and the people 
in whose midst they live. People who are part of trading networks often 
showcase their capacity to be versatile and adaptable in their religious lives 
and the ways in which doing so allows them to ‘span religious and cultural 
divides as well as continents and oceans’ (p. 79).30 We suggest in what follows 
that Afghan traders are people whose lives are not one-dimensionally geared 
towards making a homogeneous ‘Islamic space’ or a globally oriented form 
of ‘Muslim network’. It is more helpful to think of our informants, rather, as 
being men who value their capacity to diplomatically mediate between and 
profit from arbitrages between different types of spaces.31 They are individuals 
who embody connections to one another that are as much about trade and 
pragmatism as about being Muslim.32 If in the Kantian tradition the notion 
of cosmopolitanism arose as a requirement to temper the nationalist extremes 
of the modern nation-state, many traders from Afghanistan emphasise their 
capacity to achieve prestige and repute by moving across transregional spaces 
that transcend, yet not in a manner that contests the boundaries of such 
nation-states. The ways in which they do so challenges the notion that being 
Muslim in a global and cosmopolitan way inevitably results in hostility 
towards the idea of the nation-state.33
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Beyond Diasporas: Poly-stranded and Multimodal Trading Networks
The traders from Afghanistan with whom we have been working do not form 
a homogeneous ‘diaspora’ in the conventional sense of collectively defining 
themselves as belonging to a group from a shared geographical locale that is 
able to trace its origins back to a single moment of dispersal. The traders are 
better thought of, rather, as forming poly-stranded and multimodal trad-
ing networks.34 The traders’ networks are poly-stranded in that while they 
are made up by individuals willing to describe themselves as being ‘from 
Afghanistan’, they are simultaneously organised in relationship to specific 
regional identities; the specific nature of the networks play a critical role in 
shaping the particular commodities in which individual traders deal, as well 
as the geographical contexts in which they operate. The networks are multi-
modal in that the collective trading activities of merchants from Afghanistan 
do not rely on a single, central node in which information is shared and 
capital distributed but, rather, on multiple and interlinked nodes, none of 
which is significantly more influential than the others.
The different networks that people from Afghanistan form collaborate 
with one another, but more often specialise in either different merchandise or 
in the distribution of commodities to distinct geographical regions. Traders 
in Yiwu who freight goods from China to Afghanistan are especially numer-
ous. Such traders belong to various ethnic groups (though many are Pashto-
speaking Pashtuns from Afghanistan’s eastern provinces and Farsi-speaking 
Tajiks from provinces to the north of Kabul). Such traders are mostly Sunni, 
but there are also several and well-established Shiʿī traders involved in the 
trade in commodities of daily use between China and Afghanistan. In Yiwu, 
these traders have forged high degrees of commercial organisation. They have 
established committees that seek to define and delimit the price of shipping 
containers to Afghanistan. As we shall see below, the traders organise weekly 
meetings in Yiwu at which information about business and the activities of 
traders is shared. Their ties and obligations to one another are repeatedly 
established and sustained in relationship to shared Islamic rituals, especially 
those performed during Ramadan (the organisation of tarawih prayers and 
iftar feasts), as well as charitable feasts (khayrat) that mark the death of rela-
tives back home in Afghanistan (faitiha). These merchants also forge close 
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ties with the state of Afghanistan, most especially the Kabul-based Chamber 
of Commerce.
A second network comprises traders working across the former Soviet 
Union, though especially in Russia and Ukraine. These traders are ethnically 
mixed (being both Persian and Pashto speakers, as well as including a much 
smaller number of Uzbek speakers). Nevertheless, despite differences in lan-
guage and ethnicity, such traders do tend to share an ideological commitment 
to ‘being Afghan’ (partly derived out of past membership of the People’s 
Democratic Party of Afghanistan) as well as shared educational experiences 
– most studied in higher education institutes in the Soviet Union during the 
late 1980s. Indeed, the long-term workings of coercive cosmopolitanism are 
especially visible in the membership of this trading network. Amongst traders 
working in the former Soviet Republics are individuals who initially travelled 
to the region as part of Soviet programmes that placed Afghan orphans in 
Soviet boarding schools (internat) in the 1980s with the aim of creating a 
cadre of loyal pro-Soviet government servants.35 At the same time, however, 
that commitment to Afghanistan reflects the country’s modern history and its 
relationship to the Soviet Union, the specific niche activities of traders tends 
to be organised in relationship to their regional backgrounds. For example, 
in the Ukrainian port city of Odessa, home to the Seventh-Kilometre market, 
the import of children’s scooters and roller blades from Yiwu is carried out 
largely by traders from Afghanistan’s northeastern Badakhshan Province; 
by contrast, the import of umbrellas from China as well as their sale in the 
Ukraine is dominated by traders from Panjshir; the business in hardware 
items is largely handled by traders from the eastern provinces of Khost and 
Paktika, both Hindu and Muslim in terms of religious affiliation (see below). 
Importantly, though, not all of the sub-networks are formed in relationship 
to regional identity – shared professional experience can also be important in 
defining their nature. For example, during fieldwork in Yiwu we encountered 
a trading company that was involved in the export of goods to Russia and 
Ukraine, the partners of which included Pashto and Farsi speakers from 
different regions of the country who had all served as pilots during the 1980s 
in Afghanistan’s air force.
Traders able to import goods from Yiwu to the former Soviet Union 
tend to be well established in Russia and Ukraine and lead stable lives. Many 
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traders live with their families in the cities in which they work (St Petersburg, 
Moscow, Odessa and Khakov being key nodes); they hold the passports of 
Russia or Ukraine and also own property there in the form of shops, ware-
houses and homes. We have explored elsewhere the role played by marriages 
and informal relationships between Afghan traders and local women to the 
activities of traders in the former Soviet Union.36 Such marriages root mobile 
merchants in particular contexts and therefore also ensure the durability of 
such settlements as nodes for commercial activities over time. Local wives also 
bring critical skills to the trading activities of Afghan traders in this region of 
the world: they offer insights into the changing fashions of the populations 
they serve. For this reason, many traders travel with their wives to China at 
least once a year to ensure they get valuable input in terms of the orders they 
place with their Chinese suppliers. Importantly, while some women married 
to Afghans in Russia and Ukraine do convert to Islam, this is by no means the 
norm or even something that is expected by individual traders or the wider 
networks they form. Several traders have remarked to us that if they had 
wished to marry a Muslim there was no shortage of women in Afghanistan 
to choose from: they were interested, rather, in women they could trust and 
build a relationship with based on sincerity (ikhlas).
In recent years, these networks have increasingly demonstrated their 
dynamism and responsiveness to changing geopolitical circumstances. 
A significant market for goods sent from Yiwu to Odessa, for example, 
was Crimea. The annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 made this trade 
route increasingly complex for Ukraine-based Afghans. Nevertheless, within 
months of Crimea’s annexation several Odessa-based Afghan traders had 
moved to Sevastopol in Crimea, either bringing their goods from Ukraine 
using illicit routes or exporting directly from China to Crimea via Russia. 
In recent years, traders based in the former Soviet Union have increasingly 
penetrated the markets of Western Europe: traders have migrated from the 
former Soviet Union to countries in the European Union and gradually 
established trading activities in the cities to which they have moved; others 
have supplied goods sourced in China to relatives who have migrated from 
Afghanistan to Europe (often as refugees). Indeed, traders based in the former 
Soviet Union are developing increasingly complex business models. A trader 
yet to receive identity documents in the country in which he is based, for 
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example, might appoint his UK-based brother to an office in Yiwu thereby 
ensuring a steady flow of goods from China to Russia or Ukraine. Similarly, 
a trader based in Ukraine who has relatives in Afghanistan in need of work 
might arrange for someone to move to Yiwu in order to open a trading office 
that supplies him with the goods he requires. It goes without saying that such 
responsiveness to changing geopolitical contexts requires globally-oriented 
forms of knowledge and skill: the ability to interact with Russian officials in 
Crimea, for example, or the willingness to learn Chinese.
A third network that we have identified in Yiwu is made up of traders 
who work between China and the Gulf states, most especially Saudi Arabia 
but also the UAE and Oman. Most traders working in Saudi Arabia iden-
tify themselves as being Uzbek- and Turkmen-speaking people who are the 
descendants of migrants who came to Afghanistan from Central Asia after 
the Bolshevik Revolution began to affect the organisation of their societies in 
the 1920s. These traders – who mostly procure clothing and machine-made 
carpets in Yiwu – are helpfully conceptualised as forming a ‘mobile com-
munity’37: having left Central Asia in the 1920s they lived first in Afghanistan 
and then Pakistan; today they regularly divide their lives between Saudi 
Arabia (where they own wholesale businesses) and Turkey (a country in 
which they own homes, carpet and clothing factories, and frequently educate 
their children).38 Traders operating in the UAE and Oman also include 
Central Asian émigrés active in the sale of machine-made carpets, though in 
numerical terms merchants who identify themselves as belonging to Pashtun 
tribes from the eastern region of Paktika are most visible. These Pashtun trad-
ers are active in the sale of cloth, including silks and chiffons, from Yiwu and 
the nearby town of Keqiao to the Naif market in Dubai: from there, the cloth 
is distributed to a range of markets across the Gulf.39 These traders, however, 
are considerably more involved in the economy of Khost than the more 
mobile Central Asian émigrés. Gulf-based merchants have played an active 
role in the property market of eastern Afghanistan, as well as the opening of 
various higher education institutes.
There is a third type of more complex and multimodal network that 
criss-cross different geographies. Traders from regions of Afghanistan that 
are known for having reserves of precious and semi-precious stones (such as 
Panjshir, Badakhshan and Ghazni) often lead highly itinerant lives taking 
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stones mined in Afghanistan for polishing in Jaipur and for sale in cities 
across China. Such traders also procure stones in Bangkok and sometimes 
in Congo and Zambia; their travels are often facilitated by them holding 
passports of the countries that have become their home and that are also key 
nodes for their business activities (including Germany, South Korea, Japan, 
the United States and Hong Kong). Indeed, Marsden has spoken with several 
traders from Afghanistan who hold US passports and are involved in the 
gemstone trade between various Latin American countries (especially Peru 
and Mexico) and Hong Kong. Although these types of gemstones are traded 
by merchants of diverse nationalities from Yiwu’s Futian Market District 
5 (a section of the market that is devoted to the sale of goods imported to 
China), the city itself is not an influential node in the global gemstone trade. 
Nevertheless, these Afghan traders are present in Yiwu as a result of the city’s 
relatively streamlined administrative procedures, which makes Yiwu a good 
place to open a trading office and apply for the relevant category of Chinese 
visa.
Finally, while the networks introduced above are made up either of people 
who would identify themselves as being Muslim in one respect or another 
(though of course holding very different attitudes towards Islam and what its 
practice entails), Afghanistan’s international trading networks also include 
substantial communities of non-Muslims. In particular, Afghanistan’s Hindu 
and Sikh communities are especially active in long-distance trade. Historians 
have demonstrated the historic importance of such groups to Afghanistan’s 
commercial relations with both South Asia and Eurasia.40 Since the civil war 
of the 1990s, however, most of Afghanistan’s Hindu and Sikh families have 
left the country, migrating primarily to India, Russia or Europe (especially 
London and Hamburg). In these contexts, Afghan Hindu and Sikh traders 
import commodities from China (especially Yiwu) and sell these on cash 
(pull-e narkh) or on a credit (qarz) basis to Muslim traders from Afghanistan 
working in the same settings. We are often told during the course of field-
work how the majority of Afghan businesses run by Muslims in Russia rely 
on traders who identify themselves as Hindu and import commodities to 
Moscow from China. Indeed, Hindu and Sikh traders from Afghanistan are 
a visible feature of life in Yiwu: they regularly hold evening parties for their 
guests coming from one or other of the contexts in which the community 
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is located. Afghan Muslim traders are open about the important role that 
Hindu and Sikhs have played in their business activities, often saying that 
it would have been impossible to commence trading abroad if the country’s 
‘Hindus’ had not been willing to provide them with goods on credit.41
Geographically, therefore, the traders are active globally, though, as 
noted above, particular networks specialise in the trade in commodities 
between relatively well-defined regions. In terms of ethnicity and regional 
identity, some networks are more homogeneous and cohesive (e.g., Central 
Asian émigrés) than others (Yiwu–Afghanistan traders). Yet given that they 
operate in nodes like Yiwu where multiple networks coalesce, all the networks 
ultimately establish relationships with people from Afghanistan who identify 
with different groups than their own. Indeed, whether traders based in Yiwu 
from Afghanistan are working in the markets of Russia, Afghanistan or Saudi 
Arabia, they are often strongly encouraged by the community to attend a 
weekly Thursday evening social gathering (majlis ijtimoye) that is held in an 
Afghan-owned shisha parlour. During the gathering, traders share informa-
tion about the conditions in the settings in which they are working, including 
legal and policy changes in Yiwu that affect their practices and everyday 
lives in the city. Far from being either the one-dimensional victims of the 
instability of their home country or the type of persons that are easily lured 
by the cosmopolitan visions of global Islamic community or a re-imagined 
caliphate, these traders and their networks are increasingly successful, well 
established and able to profit from the many different settings and countries 
over which they operate.
A Walking Tour through Yiwu
Yiwu has been widely represented in the media and more scholarly accounts 
as being the supermarket of the Arab world: not only is the mix of traders 
that travel to the city far more diverse than this image suggests, but so too 
do traders from many more parts of the world than the Middle East and 
Africa visit the city as commodity traders.42 Over a period of seven months in 
2016, we conducted several fieldwork exercises in order to map the trading 
communities that are a relatively stable and established feature of Yiwu’s 
landscape. Surveys concerning the backgrounds of the foreign traders were 
conducted on a daily basis in the Five Districts of Futian Market, weekly 
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visits were made to the Wu Ai stock market and Huanyuen Garment Market, 
and we also undertook a detailed spatial analysis of Chouzhou Lu – the main 
artery connecting the city to Futian Market. We also spent time exploring 
the Bingwan Night Market (there are several retail shops in the market that 
are frequented by foreign visitors keen to buy presents to take home or seek 
inspiration for new products to purchase at a wholesale level) and interview-
ing the owners of numerous international restaurants in the city. Finally, we 
also conducted participant observation with owners of foreign companies and 
their staff, as well as with foreign traders who had enrolled into schools that 
offered Chinese-language lessons tailored to the needs of business people. 
We were invited on occasions to accompany foreign traders to place orders 
in Futian and nearby factories, to receive merchandise from suppliers in 
warehouses, and to fill containers in Yiwu’s inland port.
Let us take the reader on a brief walking tour of Yiwu in order to give 
a sense of the many communities present in and their distribution through 
space in the city. We will treat the city’s main artery (Chouzhou Lu) as 
the basis for our tour. The neighbourhoods of Futian Second District and 
Changchun are located in the part of Chouzhou Lu closest to the Futian 
Market. These areas of five-storey apartment buildings, which include the 
Futian Tower, are used for both living and commercial purposes. This zone 
is popular amongst Russian, Iranian, Azeri, Ukrainian, Uzbek, Kazakh, 
Turkmen, Tajik and Afghan trading companies. While diverse, in this part 
of the city the main international languages of trade and sociality are Russian, 
multiple Turkic languages (especially Uyghur, Uzbek, Azeri, Turkmen and 
Kazakh), and Persian (Farsi, Dari and Tajik).43 The area is also the site of 
many wholesale shops selling jewellery and beads, as well as Uyghur, Central 
Asian and Afghan restaurants catering for foreign visitors and, on occasion, 
their Chinese guests. This area is not homogeneously made up of traders from 
post-Soviet Central Asia and neighbouring regions; Changchun is also an 
attractive space for Latin American traders and companies, especially those 
from Colombia and Bolivia.
Further down Chouzhou Lu in the direction of the city centre the walker 
will come to a crossroads at which two landmarks famous amongst Yiwu’s 
foreign traders are located: the Jimao and Jimei Towers. Numerous Afghan 
companies run offices in these buildings, as well as two rooms popularly 
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called ‘mosques’ that are mostly used by worshippers from Afghanistan to 
conduct their daily prayers. On a street perpendicular to Jimao Tower lies 
a zone that is noticeable for a preponderance of Indian restaurants, hotels 
and trading companies. Between these Indian-characterised streets and 
Zongze Road, there are several buildings dedicated mainly to the wholesale 
of Christmas decorations, LED-lights, beads, supermarket trolleys, shelves 
and mannequins, along with the odd Nepali eatery. As the walker proceeds 
closer to the city centre, she or he will begin to encounter clusters of Afghan 
and Iranian companies – the latter mainly being run by Kurds who ship 
goods from Yiwu to the Iraqi sectors of Kurdistan and from there, by road, to 
the many commercial border cities in the Iranian provinces of Kurdistan and 
Azerbaijan. Unsurprisingly, the restaurants in this area of Yiwu included the 
now closed ‘Tehran’ and the unambiguously named ‘Kurdistan’.
Another important intersection in Yiwu is the crossroads of Chouzhou Lu 
and Zongze Road. This intersection is home to a restaurant that has become 
a well-known geographical reference point in Yiwu: ‘Ariana’, an Afghan-
owned eatery that, with over ten years of service, has come to be thought of 
by traders as being a high-end establishment, and is said to have captured a 
significant portion of the city’s culinary market. Afghans often remark that 
the establishment’s owner (a Farsi-speaker from northeastern Afghanistan) 
was clever to choose this particular location: a ‘crossroads’ (chahrahi) on 
the route taken by traders between the market and the city, it captures the 
attention of everyone in the city. Even Chinese taxi drivers unmistakably 
know the location of ‘Ariana’ – meaning that the corner where the restaurant 
stands is now also a popular meeting point. On the opposite side of the road, 
an Afghan competitor opened another restaurant to the public a couple of 
years back, although its cheap buffet finds Ariana and its hard-won clientele 
a tough act to follow. There are further Afghan establishments in this part of 
town: a café (‘Qasr-e-Shirin’, or Palace of Sweets), and ‘Kabul Darbar’– an 
eatery popular with some Afghans but mostly with Arabs and Pakistanis.
About 10 minutes further down the street the walker will encounter 
the central office of the Bank of China (noticeable for the throngs of Hui 
foreign currency dealers standing outside): this building marks the first signs 
of the influence of ‘the Middle East’ on Yiwu’s urban space. An Egyptian 
restaurant and a joint Turkish–Syrian venture are popular for food and 
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shisha amongst traders from the Middle East, although Afghanistan’s Central 
Asian émigrés also organise their iftar feasts here, saying they have come to 
appreciate Turkish food during their many visits to Istanbul. There are also 
retail shops owned by Syrian traders that sell clothing (especially veils, ʿ abayas 
and dresses aimed at Muslim women), as well as retail shops (also owned by 
well-established Arab traders from the Middle East) selling electronics and 
lights.44 On the corner of Chouzhou Lu and Bingwan Road, the famous 
‘Sultan’ restaurant can be found, which offers Turkish cuisine and is fre-
quented by traders of all nationalities. From ‘Sultan’ further down the street 
there are a string of Middle Eastern establishments, including a Syrian-owned 
supermarket, a Syrian butcher, as well as another Turkish restaurant. This 
Turkish establishment is often frequented by Russian-speaking traders as the 
restaurant staff speak Russian because the Turkish businessman who owns it 
is married to a woman from Belorussia. Nearby, there is the bar-restaurant 
‘Moscow’ offering Russian and European cuisine as well as live music per-
formed on occasion by a Mongolian student married to a Russian woman. At 
the frontiers of this Turkish–Russian area can be found an Iranian restaurant 
(Shirin): Shirin’s sober and typically Iranian interior (including a small foun-
tain and traditional raised wooden benches, or takht, on which diners may 
recline and relax while drinking tea and taking a qailoon) is in contrast to the 
nightclub below ‘Empire’, which is renowned for its attractive Russian female 
entertainers or ‘party girls’. As the walker continues her or his stroll down 
Chouzhou Lu she or he will come across several Arab establishments and 
also an increasingly lively street scene: MC Café, for example, is usually full 
of traders from Algeria, Mauritania and Morocco, seeking good coffee and 
a chair on the kerb. Nearby is Bubus Café, owned by a trader from Bosnia, 
and next to Bubus, are two restaurants owned by Coptic Egyptians – a good 
escape for traders (and fieldworkers) attempting to find something to eat in 
the day during Ramadan.
In this zone, McDonald’s is typically full of Chinese and foreign trad-
ers seeking a fast and cheap meal and a good view of the road towards the 
park that lies opposite and the popular Bingwan Night Market. Between the 
night market and the area officially called Bingwan, but popularly known 
as Maedha (after a famous Egyptian-owned restaurant), there are dozens of 
establishments owned by Arabs, including the Syrian restaurants ‘Aleppo’ and 
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‘Damascus’, the Kurdish-Iraqi-owned ‘Shakhawan’, the Chinese-owned but 
Iraqi established ‘Erbil’, and the Yemeni ‘Sabah’, which is especially popular 
amongst traders from East Africa (Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Tanzania). 
An Afghan restaurant was also established in this area, though it was unsuc-
cessful because, as one trader told us, everybody already has their ‘own line’ 
in this part of the city and an Afghan eatery did not fit in. In this otherwise 
distinctly Middle Eastern space, the Bingwan night market is a context in 
which Chinese shopkeepers and foreign visitors meet on a daily basis for 
shopping, strolling and relaxing in the evenings. The area around the night 
market is thus home to numerous Uyghur-run restaurants, mini-markets and 
stalls selling barbecued meat, as well as vendors of Chinese street food, the 
smell of which is a constant source of complaint by our Afghan informants. 
A short ride by taxi from this night market is to be found in the Wu Ai area, 
home to numerous trading companies owned by Arabs, as well as restaurants 
from the Middle East, including the Yemeni ‘Shibam’. Wu Ai is one of several 
neighbourhoods in which foreign traders with families prefer to live.
Living the City
If the above description covers the areas running along Chouzhou Lu 
from Futian market to the night market, elsewhere in the city mixed and 
multinational forms of sociality are more pronounced. For the children of 
traders who run established companies in the city, there are several foreign 
schools that have been opened and are managed by foreigners, including the 
Chinese–Egyptian Modern School and the Rainbow Kids preschool near 
Yiwu’s central mosque. The latter preschool is staffed by female teachers from 
Muslim backgrounds, including both foreigners, Chinese Han who have 
converted to Islam, as well as Uyghurs and Hui. The owner of the school has 
also popularised electronic books that help Muslims seeking to memorise the 
Qurʾān. Yiwu is indeed home to growing communities of people of Muslim 
background from elsewhere in China, especially Hui Chinese-speaking 
Muslims who migrate to the city from the provinces of Yunnan, Nagxi and 
Gansu, and Uyghurs from various locales across Xinjiang.45 Yiwu’s Muslims 
– foreigners and Chinese citizens – tend to gather on Fridays at the city’s 
mosque (a former silk factory) that was completed in 2012, thanks to dona-
tions made by local and foreign Muslims, including one donation in the form 
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of several tonnes of Iranian marble. It is calculated that every week 7,000 
people attend the mosque.46 Yet, in addition to this busy mosque, Yiwu 
also hosts several officially registered and non-registered places of worship; 
many of the Muslim restaurants mentioned above also house prayer rooms 
for Muslims. There is also a Hindu temple inside the Futian market, several 
Catholic churches with services in Spanish, English, Korean and Chinese, 
as well as a Protestant and a Coptic church – the latter being frequented by 
Egyptian, Syrian and Sudanese Christian merchants, as well as converted 
Han Chinese.
It is in the field of religious practice that the traders from Afghanistan 
with whom we are acquainted are most circumspect about their daily behav-
iour in Yiwu. Few of the traders in the city are especially public or ostenta-
tious about their religiosity, except in terms of their having undertaken the 
ªajj pilgrimage, a ritual that even Afghans in their thirties based in Yiwu 
have performed on several occasions. Indeed, traders often remarked to us 
that in China the local police are less concerned about Muslim foreigners 
if they knew they drink and attend nightclubs than if they are perceived to 
be particularly pious and God-fearing. During Ramadan, however, tensions 
between traders from Afghanistan willing to organise religious events and the 
local authorities who are suspicious of such activities do arise. In June 2016, 
for example, traders from Afghanistan owning hotels that in previous years 
had been used as venues for prayer gatherings, Qur’ānic recitations and if†ar 
feasts were told by the local authorities that such gatherings could be held 
only in rooms especially designated for such purposes. This change in state 
attention was believed to have been caused by security concerns arising from 
the G20 meeting scheduled to be held in Hangzhou around that time.
To what extent are forms of mixing across ethnic, regional, national and 
regional groupings an aspect of the everyday sociality of foreign traders based 
in Yiwu? Islamic cosmopolitanism (or the promise of it) requires Muslims 
and non-Muslims from very different backgrounds to jointly participate in 
establishing open-ended relationships. At first glance, the spatial organisation 
of Yiwu reveals above all else the importance of the nation-state and the 
ethno-linguistically defined region as being the salient markers of the identi-
ties of the traders. As we have seen above, particular city districts have been 
shaped as distinctively ‘post-Soviet’, ‘Indian’, ‘Arab’ or ‘Afghan’ by the day-
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to-day activities of foreign traders. Importantly, however, if Yiwu appears at 
first sight to be organised in relationship to ethnicity or nationality, then the 
spaces delimited above correspond more to trans-regional borderlands than 
to nation-states per se. Traders from Afghanistan and Iranian Kurdistan own 
businesses cheek by jowl, for example; at times, Kurdish Iranians find in some 
Afghan traders the ideal companionship to discuss their common Sunni iden-
tity or the politics and tensions between Sunni and Shiʿī in their respective 
nation-states. While the Iraqi Kurdish restaurants in the ‘Arab quarter’ are 
visited by Iranian Kurds (who are often also cross-border business partners), 
Russian-speaking Afghans frequently gather in a Tajik restaurant to talk to 
their Central Asian peers and their Russian-speaking Han Chinese associates 
hailing from cities along the China–Russia border. Similarly, the Arab area of 
the city is a complex mixture of traders who are not only Arab but also from 
settings across East Africa. The preponderance of spaces catering to Muslims 
from distinct borderlands reflects, more generally, the role that such types of 
geopolitical spaces and their populations are playing in processes defined as 
collectively forming ‘globalisation from below’.
But whilst ethnicity and regional identity have contributed in significant 
ways to the distribution of businesses and the organisation of public space 
in Yiwu, how do Muslims living in the city inhabit the city on a daily basis? 
Many of the Afghan traders with whom we have spent time, for example, 
confessed to preferring to spend their evening leisure time in parts of the 
city that were not clearly marked out by their businesses or clientele as being 
particularly ‘Afghan’. This reflected multiple concerns on the part of traders. 
Traders of Afghan background visiting Yiwu from the former Soviet Union 
often remarked to us that their attitudes were distinct from those of their 
countrymen based in Afghanistan: as a result, they preferred to spend their 
time in parts of the city that were Russian or ‘international’ rather than in 
the cafes and restaurants run by their compatriots. Only by doing so, they 
admitted, could they enjoy a drink in a street-side cafe owned by an African 
and soak up Yiwu’s distinctive atmosphere. Thus, a group of traders with 
whom Marsden spent several nights at shisha parlours preferred to visit estab-
lishments owned by Arabs and Iranians rather than members of the Afghan 
community. Other Afghan traders who have been based in Yiwu for years and 
spoke fluent Chinese told Iban˜ez-Tirado that they preferred to spend their 
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day off at barbecues organised by their Chinese friends at which litres of beer 
were available, and that would usually end up at raucous KTV’s karaoke bars 
where other Afghan visitors, or indeed, Muslim traders, would rarely venture. 
Further informants – often those based permanently in Yiwu rather than men 
visiting the city on short-time procurement sorties from the settings in which 
they owned businesses – also remarked that they could talk more openly to 
one another about their business activities in parts of the city where there 
were less likely to be other Afghans. In terms of the choices that traders from 
Afghanistan make about leisure and sociality, then, the willingness to experi-
ence spaces other than those simply designated as ‘Afghan’ or ‘Muslim’ is an 
important part of their modes of experiencing and inhabiting the city.
Importantly, there are a range of activities undertaken by traders in Yiwu 
that are premised upon establishing relationships with people from back-
grounds different from their own, including those that traverse the boundary 
between Muslim and non-Muslim. For many of the traders, Saturday night 
is the evening of the week in which it is normal to relax and spend time 
with friends, mostly in one of the two nightclubs that are frequented by the 
city’s foreign traders. With a distinctively Latin atmosphere, as salsa music 
and similar rhythms are usually played in these disco-bars, such venues are 
preferred sites of relaxation for the numerous women from countries such as 
Ethiopia, Italy, Russia, Brazil, Bolivia and Mexico who work and live in Yiwu 
as traders, commodity designers and company managers. On one Saturday, 
for example, Marsden was invited to join a group of traders from northeast 
Afghanistan on a trip to one of these nightclubs. The traders (including one 
who was referred to by his friends as Óaji having undertaken the pilgrim-
age to Mecca) told Marsden that they hoped that he would be able to use 
his limited Spanish to help them meet women from Colombia who also 
attended the nightclub. The evening did not progress according to the trad-
ers’ expectations, however: the men had anticipated being able to find a table 
around which they could sit and survey the dance floor, yet because it was a 
busy evening in the club, they were forced to stand awkwardly, and to their 
minds demandingly, at the edge of the bar. It was collectively decided – after 
they had ruefully remarked to Marsden that at least he could enjoy a beer, 
something they were unable to do – that there was no point spending further 
time in the nightclub. Having bid goodbye to the traders, Marsden spent the 
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remainder of the evening with a small group of traders from Kabul and their 
Chinese girlfriends.
Conclusion
The focus of this chapter has been the city of Yiwu and the nature of Afghan 
networks present in the city. By inserting such networks both in the context 
of the wider global settings and in terms of the traders’ experience of space 
in Yiwu, we have sought to contribute to an emerging body of literature on 
Muslim cosmopolitanism in two ways. First, we have brought attention to 
the ways in which the expressions of Muslim cosmopolitanism visible in 
Yiwu are premised on violent histories of international conflict and interfer-
ence that have led to massive displacements of the country’s people, as well 
the bleaching out of the country’s own religious diversity.47 Secondly, it is 
also important to recognise, as others have,48 that if the traders with whom 
we work are cosmopolitan in some aspects of their lives, then in others they 
reinforce and sustain collective commitment to national, regional, ideological 
and confessional identities, identities that are also of critical significance to 
their activities as traders.
Besides, the Afghan traders whose lives are presented in the chapter bring 
attention to forms of mobility that are very different from those associated 
with commonplace understandings of Afghanistan. Whereas much scholar-
ship and popular writing on Afghanistan points to the centrality of the 
flight by refugees and labour migrants to the West to contemporary forms 
of Afghan mobility, the people with whom we work travel across a wide 
range of Asian and Eurasian settings, most often in connection with their 
activities as commodity traders and transporters. The extensive, cyclical and 
repetitive nature of such journeys and connections reveal the role that these 
traders have played in forging long-distance trading routes and establishing 
durable nodes for their activities. Conventional treatments of Afghanistan 
would no doubt link such forms of movement to one or another form of 
illegality, be it money laundering or heroin trafficking. We have brought 
attention rather to the many skills and capacities that these mobile traders 
bring to their work, be they in terms of the ability and willingness to speak 
multiple languages, engage with and respond to geopolitical transformations, 
establish relationships with local authorities, and enter into long-term and 
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mutually reinforcing relationships with women of diverse ethno-national and 
religious backgrounds. In these respects, the everyday lives of these traders 
suggest the possibility of the promise of open-ended forms of cosmopolitan 
Muslim identity, forms of cosmopolitanism moreover that are premised on 
relationships with Muslims and non-Muslims.
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